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NEUMANN–DIRICHLET NASH STRATEGIES FOR THE SOLUTION
OF ELLIPTIC CAUCHY PROBLEMS∗
A. HABBAL† AND M. KALLEL‡
Abstract. We consider the Cauchy problem for an elliptic operator, formulated as a Nash
game. The overspecified Cauchy data are split between two players: the first player solves the elliptic
equation with the Dirichlet part of the Cauchy data prescribed over the accessible boundary and a
variable Neumann condition (which we call first player’s strategy) prescribed over the inaccessible
part of the boundary. The second player makes use correspondingly of the Neumann part of the
Cauchy data, with a variable Dirichlet condition prescribed over the inaccessible part of the boundary.
The first player then minimizes the gap related to the nonused Neumann part of the Cauchy data,
and so does the second player with a corresponding Dirichlet gap. The two costs are coupled through
a difference term. We prove that there always exists a unique Nash equilibrium, which turns out
to be the reconstructed data when the Cauchy problem has a solution. We also prove that the
completion Nash game has a stable solution with respect to noisy data. Some numerical two- and
three-dimensional experiments are provided to illustrate the efficiency and stability of our algorithm.
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∇.(k∇u) = 0 in Ω,
u = f on Γc,
k∇u.ν = Φ on Γc,
(1.1)
where Ω is a bounded open domain in Rd (d = 2, 3) with a sufficiently smooth bound-
ary ∂Ω composed of two connected disjoint components Γc and Γi. The parameters k,
f , and Φ are given functions, and ν is the unit outward normal vector on the bound-
ary. The Dirichlet data f and the Neumann data Φ are the so-called Cauchy data,
which are known on the accessible part Γc of the boundary ∂Ω, and the unknown field
u is the Cauchy solution.
The above Cauchy problem is also known as a data completion problem, where
the data to be recovered, or missing data, are u|Γi and k∇u.ν|Γi , which are determined
as soon as one knows u in the whole domain Ω. The Cauchy problem is a prototype
of inverse boundary value problems (IBVP), which model a wide field of applications
ranging from medical imaging to detection and nondestructive testing, and addressing
quasi exhaustively all the fields of physics, from electromagnetism to acoustics and
fluid and structural mechanics (see, e.g., [9, 10, 13, 17]).
Classically, IBVP are known to be ill-posed. For instance, the solution of the
Cauchy problem does not always exist for any pair of data (f,Φ), and if such a
solution exists, it does not always depend continuously on the data (Hadamard’s ill-
posedness; see [21]). The Cauchy data (f,Φ) are called compatible (or consistent)
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if the corresponding Cauchy problem (1.1) has a solution. (It is then unique thanks
to classical continuation arguments.) Ill-posedness in the sense of Hadamard makes
classical numerical methods usually inappropriate because they are unstable, and
there is a need for carefully stabilized dedicated computational methods, sometimes
by regularizing (through reformulation of) the Cauchy problem itself. Readers may
refer to a wide literature dealing with the efficient numerical solution of elliptic Cauchy
problems, e.g., [4, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23], and, dealing with the ill-posedness for the Cauchy
problem, [3, 11, 12] among many others.
Our purpose is to introduce an original method to solve the Cauchy problem,
based on a game theory approach. We first recall in section 2 an optimal control
formulation to solve the Cauchy problem used, e.g., in [1, 4, 23]. We then show
in section 3 that the control formulation naturally leads to a Nash game of static
nature with complete information, which involves Dirichlet gap and Neumann gap
costs. The existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium is proved, and when
the Cauchy solution exists, it turns out that the Nash equilibrium is exactly the
pair of missing data of the Cauchy problem; afterward, we end the section with a
convergence result with respect to noisy data. Section 4 is devoted to sensitivity and
implementation aspects, used to lead some numerical experiments. The numerical
results are presented in section 5 to illustrate the efficiency of the present game-based
approach. We end the paper with some concluding remarks.
The reader interested in some PDE-oriented applications of game theory may refer
to [19, 20], where multidisciplinary topology optimization problems are formulated in
words of Nash games; application to multiobjective shape optimization is considered
in [26] and a multicriteria elliptic control problem where two independent controls play
the role of strategies is studied in [25]. Refer to [8, 24, 28] for a general introduction
and proof of convergence of computational methods for Nash equilibria, and refer to
[5, 6, 7] for a study of alternating algorithms which are closely linked to our present
approach.
2. An optimal control formulation of the Cauchy problem. We assume
that the boundary ∂Ω and the data k, Φ, and f are smooth enough, at least Ω has




2 (Γc). In this case, the
Cauchy solution u, if it exists, belongs to the space H1(Ω).
Many authors have formulated the Cauchy problem (1.1) as an optimal control
one; see, e.g., [1, 4, 23]. The setting is as follows.
For given η ∈ H−
1
2 (Γi) and τ ∈ H
1
2 (Γi), let us define u1(η) and u2(τ) as the





∇.(k∇u1) = 0 in Ω,
u1 = f on Γc,





∇.(k∇u2) = 0 in Ω,
u2 = τ on Γi,
k∇u2.ν = Φ on Γc.
(2.1)
The optimization problem amounts to minimizing, among all Neumann–Dirichlet




2 (Γi), the following “Neumann-gap” cost:
















It can be easily proved that when the Cauchy problem (1.1) has a solution, then
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They also proved that the functional J1 is twice Fréchet differentiable and strictly
convex.
The same conclusions above hold when a “Dirichlet-gap” cost is considered:















Let us remark that, depending on the authors, many other coupling terms were
considered, among which are the difference of the normal derivatives of the fields over
Γi and distributed difference in the L
2(Ω) norm.
3. A Nash game formulation of the Cauchy problem. From the previous
section, we remark that, formulated in the game theory language, the Neumann and
Dirichlet controls η and τ do cooperate to minimize either the Neumann-gap or the
Dirichlet-gap costs. These two controls could as well cooperatively minimize any
convex combination of the two costs J1 and J2.
Now, the fields u1(η) and u2(τ) are aiming at the fulfillment of a possibly antag-










. This antagonism is intimately related to Hadamard’s
ill-posedness character of the Cauchy problem and rises as soon as one requires that
u1 and u2 coincide, which is exactly what the coupling term ‖u1 − u2‖L2(Γi) is for.
Thus, one may think of an iterative process which minimizes in a smart fashion the
three terms, namely, Neumann–Dirichlet coupling terms.
Let us define the following two costs: for any η ∈ H−
1








































where the fields u1(η) and u2(τ) are the unique solutions to (SP1) and (SP2), respec-
tively, and α is a given positive parameter (e.g., α = 1). Differently from the definition
of J1,J2 above, the coupling term is now the difference between the normal deriva-





for which the same proof techniques apply.
One may consider a decomposition-like method where the variable η is used to
minimize the Neumann gap + coupling term, in other words J1, and τ is used to
minimize the Dirichlet gap + coupling term, which defines J2. Such a method fits
into the area of mathematical games.
We shall say that there are two players, referred to as player 1 or Neumann gap,
and player 2 or Dirichlet gap. Player 1 controls the strategy variable η which belongs
to the first player’s strategy spaceH−
1
2 (Γi), and player 2 controls the strategy variable
τ which belongs to the second player’s strategy space H
1
2 (Γi). Each of the two players
tries to minimize its own cost, namely, J1 (Neumann gap + coupling term) for player
1 and J2 (Dirichlet gap + coupling term) for player 2. As is classical, the fact that
each player controls only his own strategy, while there is a strong dependance of
each player’s cost on the joint strategies (η, τ), justifies the use of the game theory
framework (and terminology), a natural setting which may be used to formulate the
negotiation between these two costs.
In order to be consistent with the classical formulation of the Cauchy problem, the
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one, particularly because available Dirichlet and Neumann data are not considered
in a leader-follower scheme. In this case, a commonly used solution concept (roughly
speaking, in the game vocabulary, a rational and stable one) is the one of Nash
equilibria, defined as follows.




2 (Γi) is a Nash equilibrium for
the two-player game involving the costs J1 and J2 if
(3.3)
{
J1(ηN , τN ) ≤ J1(η, τN ) ∀η ∈ H
− 1
2 (Γi),
J2(ηN , τN ) ≤ J2(ηN , τ) ∀τ ∈ H
1
2 (Γi).
It is important to notice that the present game has a separable structure. Indeed,
the players criteria are formed of individual costs, the Neumann gap depending only
on η for player 1 and the Dirichlet gap depending only on τ for player 2, plus a
common coupling cost which depends on both η and τ . The game separable structure
is crucial in our study, and we shall exploit it to prove that there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium, which is shown to be the missing data when a Cauchy solution does exist.
Based upon this structure of the criteria, we shall also establish a convergence result
with respect to noisy data.
Let us start with the following preliminary proposition.
Proposition 3.2. The partial mapping η → J1(η, τ) (resp., τ → J2(η, τ)) is a
quadratic strongly convex functional over H−
1
2 (Γi) (resp., H
1
2 (Γi)).
Proof. Note that the field u1(η) is affine with respect to η, and so is the field
u2(τ) w.r.t. the variable τ . Thus, the functions J1 and J2 are quadratic. Following,
e.g., [1], it is an easy exercise to compute their second order differentials.
Let us consider the case of J2, the case of J1 being straightforward. First, notice
that we can set
u2(ψ) = u2,0(ψ) + u2,Φ,




∇.(k∇u2,0) = 0 in Ω,
u2,0 = ψ on Γi,
k∇u2,0.ν = 0 on Γc.
(3.4)
The second order differential of J2 w.r.t. τ in any direction ψ ∈ H
1
2 (Γi) reads












It is immediate that if (d2J2(η, τ).ψ, ψ) = 0, then u2,0(ψ) = 0 over Γc, hence
u2,0(ψ) vanishes over the whole Ω thanks to (3.4), so that ψ = 0.
Indeed, strict convexity of J1 and J2 holds w.r.t. the pair (η, τ) as well. On the
contrary, we shall see that only partial ellipticity (or coerciveness) of the costs holds,
while it does not hold w.r.t. the pair (η, τ), precisely because of the coupling term.
Let us again focus on the case of J2. (Uniform ellipticity of J1 with respect to η
is explicit in its definition.)
Consider the following Steklov–Poincaré operator:
Λ : H
1
2 (Γi) → H
− 1
2 (Γi) : u2,0(ψ)|Γi(= ψ) → (k∇u2,0(ψ).ν)|Γi ,
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The operator Λ is a topological isomorphism (see [27]); thus its inverse Λ−1 is















which immediately yields the uniform strong convexity (uniform ellipticity) of the
functional J2 with respect to τ .
It is important to notice that the partial ellipticity property of η → J1(η, τ) holds
uniformly w.r.t. τ , and conversely for J2. It allows us to restrict the search for Nash
equilibria to bounded subsets of the strategy spaces if necessary.





























The following theorem states that the Nash game is well defined and has a relevant
interpretation in view of the Cauchy problem
Theorem 3.3. Consider the Nash game defined by (3.1)–(3.2)–(3.3).





It is also the minimum of L(η, τ) given by (3.5).
(ii) When the Cauchy problem has a solution u, then u1(ηN ) = u2(τN ) = u, and
(ηN , τN ) are the missing data, namely, ηN = k∇u.ν|Γi and τN = u|Γi .
Proof. The functional L is made of parts of the costs J1 and J2. It is easy to
check that it is strictly convex with respect to the pair (η, τ).
From the other part, any minimum of L is a Nash equilibrium (for the costs J1 and
J2) and conversely, thanks to the separable structure of the present game (consider
the necessary optimality conditions).
We conclude that if a Nash equilibrium exists, then, as a minimum of the strictly
convex L, it is unique.
The existence of a Nash equilibrium (ηN , τN ) ∈ H
− 1
2 (Γi) × H
1
2 (Γi), id est a
pair which fulfills (3.3), is obtained by a direct application of the Nash theorem:
since strategy variables belong to Hilbert spaces, the uniform partial ellipticity of
the costs allows for the choice of large enough closed bounded balls, which are then
weakly compact convex sets, then continuity of the convex costs yields the weak lower
semicontinuity over the so-defined balls.
Finally, note that if a Cauchy solution u does exist, then by setting ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi
and τC = u|Γi , one has immediately L(ηC , τC) = 0, since thanks to the uniqueness
of the Cauchy solution, u1(ηC) = u2(τC) = u. In this case, one has that (ηC , τC) is
the minimum of the nonnegative functional L, and so it is also the Nash equilibrium
(ηN , τN ).
Let us now consider the case of noisy data. An important issue to consider when
performing data completion is the stability (in the sense of robustness) of the identified
solution with respect to the noise magnitude.
We assume that there exists a pair of compatible data (f,Φ) and denote by u the
corresponding Cauchy solution. We consider a family of not necessarily compatible




2 (Γc) such that


















2(τ) are the solution
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∇.(k∇uδ1) = 0 in Ω,
uδ1 = f
δ on Γc,




∇.(k∇uδ2) = 0 in Ω,




We define the associated cost functionals:









































The functions Jδ1 and J
δ
2 enjoy the same properties than J1 and J2, claimed in








One may ask if, when δ → 0, the Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ
δ
N ) does converge to









converge to the Cauchy solution u?
The answer, positive, is given by the following theorem, which states that we have
strong convergence of both the Nash equilibrium and fields sequences above.
Theorem 3.4. Assume there exists a unique Cauchy solution u ∈ H1(Ω) for a









2 (Γc) be any sequence of noisy data such that










Then, the Nash game corresponding to the costs Jδ1 and J
δ
2 defined by (3.8)–(3.9) has
a unique Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ
δ




2 (Γi) which strongly converges, as
δ → 0, to the Cauchy missing data (k∇u.ν|Γi , u|Γi). Moreover, the solutions to (3.7),
respectively uδ1(η
δ




N ), strongly converge in H
1(Ω) to the Cauchy solution
u.
Proof. Let us again use the notation ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi and τC = u|Γi the Cauchy
missing data, and introduce the auxiliary functions
zδ1 = u
δ





The functions zδ1 and z
δ




∇.(k∇zδ1) = 0 in Ω,
zδ1 = f
δ − f on Γc,




∇.(k∇zδ2) = 0 in Ω,
zδ2 = 0 on Γi,
k∇zδ2.ν = Φ
δ − Φ on Γc.
(3.10)































Replacing uδ1(ηC) in (3.11) by (z
δ
1 + u) and idem with u
δ
2(τC), we obtain
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Then, using the continuity of the trace operator from H1(Ω) onto H
1
2 (∂Ω), and
the continuity of the normal trace operator from H1(Ω) onto H−
1
2 (∂Ω), it is easy to
show that






















1 fulfills the elliptic equation
with nonhomogeneous Dirichlet condition f δ − f , and zδ2 one with nonhomogeneous
Neumann condition Φδ − Φ, one gets
(3.15) Lδ(ηC , τC) ≤ (2 + α)
(










≤ (2 + α)δ2.
We have previously seen that the Nash equilibrium (ηδN , τ
δ
N ) is also the unique





N ) ≤ L
δ(ηδN , τ
δ
N ) ≤ L






N ) ≤ (2 + α)δ
2 as well.
Now, since the mapping η → Jδ1 (η, τ) is coercive, uniformly in τ (and in δ), and
since the same corresponding property holds for τ → Jδ2 (η, τ), we obtain that the
sequence (ηδN ) is uniformly bounded in H
− 1
2 (Γi) and (τ
δ
N ) is uniformly bounded in
H
1
2 (Γi). Thus, up to a subsequence, we have from one part that η
δ
N converges weakly
to some η0N ∈ H
− 1
2 (Γi) and from other part, the sequence τ
δ
N converges weakly to
some τ0N ∈ H
1
2 (Γi).
Since by assumption (3.6), as δ goes to zero, the sequence f δ strongly converges
to f in H
1
2 (Γc) and Φ
δ strongly converges to Φ in H−
1
2 (Γc), we conclude that the
sequences uδ1(η
δ




N ), which are the solutions to (3.7), weakly converge in
H1(Ω) to respectively u1(η
0
N ) and u2(τ
0





∇.(k∇u1) = 0 in Ω,











k∇u2.ν = Φ on Γc.
(3.17)
Taking δ → 0 in (3.16) yields that (k∇uδ1.ν − Φ
δ) strongly converges to 0 in
H−
1
2 (Γc), which means that (k∇u
δ
1.ν) strongly converges to Φ.
Hence, k∇u1.ν = Φ over Γc.
Thanks to the uniqueness of the Cauchy problem, we conclude that u1 = u. The
same reasoning applied to the first term in Jδ2 would directly yield u2 = f over Γc
and thanks to (3.17), we conclude that the fields u1 and u2 are equal to the Cauchy
solution u.
Finally, observe that Lδ(ηδN , τ
δ
N ) tends to zero with δ, which expresses that the
trace of the difference (uδ1−u
δ
2) strongly converges to zero in H
1
2 (Γc), and the trace of
its normal derivative strongly converges to zero in H−
1














since k∇u1.ν = Φ over Γc, it is then easy to check that u
δ
1 indeed strongly converges
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Consequently, as traces of strongly convergent sequences, we have then proved
that the sequence (ηδN ) strongly converges in H
− 1
2 (Γi) to η
0
N = ηC = k∇u.ν|Γi and
that the sequence (τδN ) strongly converges in H
1
2 (Γi) to τ
0
N = τC = u|Γi.
4. Numerical procedure. From the computational viewpoint, in [6] the authors
propose an alternating minimization algorithm, also referred to as the inertial Nash
equilibration process, to compute the the Nash equilibrium by means of the following
iterative process.
Let (η0, τ0) be a given initial state
(4.1)
{





τ (k+1) = argminτ{J2(η
(k+1), τ) + β2
∫
Γi
(τ − τ (k))2dΓi},
where β is a given positive parameter (e.g., β = 1).
In [6], the convergence of the alternating algorithm above is proved under suitable
assumptions which also hold in our case; see Proposition 3.2.
Our algorithm is written as follows:
Set k = 0. Starting from an initial guess S(0) = (η(0), τ (0)):
Step 1: Compute η(k), which solves minη J1(η, τ
(k))
and set η(k+1) = t η(k) + (1− t) η(k), 0 < t < 1.
Step 2: Compute τ (k), which solves minτ J2(η
(k+1), τ)
and set τ (k+1) = t τ (k) + (1− t) τ (k), 0 < t < 1.
Step 3: Set S(k+1) = (η(k+1), τ (k+1)).
Redo (Step 1) until the sequence S(k) converges.
As a stopping criterion we used the classical stationarity one,
‖S(k+1) − S(k)‖ ≤ ǫ,
where ǫ is given small enough tolerance. The relaxation parameter t above is used
to accelerate the convergence of the alternating algorithm, whose convergence rate
is relatively slow. (The expected convergence speed may be drawn from the proof
of Propositon 4.4 in [5].) One may also consider parallel implementations for the
computation of a Nash equilibrium in order to save overall computation time. Such
distributed algorithms have been studied in, e.g., [8] and [24].
It is easy to show that the above procedure is equivalent to the algorithm (4.1) as
soon as one uses a fixed step gradient method to solve the partial optimization prob-
lems in Step 1 and Step 2 above. For the numerical problem, we used the discretized
version which was proved to converge in [28].
To this end, the gradients may be efficiently computed by means of an adjoint
state method. Let us define, for the case of, e.g., J1, the following Lagrangian:
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2 (Γi), where the latter two spaces are given by
W1 = {v ∈ H
1(Ω) such that v|Γc = 0} and W2 = H
1(Ω).
The Lagrangian is used to compute the gradients ∇ηJ1 and ∇τJ2. (Wherever
it is involved, the inner product in the Hilbert space H−
1
2 (Γi) is represented using a
classical integral notation.)

















(η, τ)ξ = −
∫
Γi
(λ1 − α(η − k∇u2.ν)) ξ dΓi ∀ ξ ∈ H
− 1
2 (Γi),
whereλ1 ∈ W1 solves the adjoint problem
∫
Ω
k∇λ1.∇γ dΩ = −
∫
Γc


























(k∇λ2.ν)h dΓi, h ∈ H
1
2 (Γi),




∇.k∇λ2 = 0 in Ω,
k∇λ2.ν = f − u2 on Γc,
λ2 = −α (η − k∇u2.ν) on Γi.
5. Numerical results. The computational methodology used to illustrate the
efficiency of the present approach is classical. All experiments are performed on a
personal computer and all the PDEs are numerically solved using FreeFem++ [22],
a finite element based free software. In order to obtain accurate approximations of
the normal derivatives of u1, u2, and of λ2, the dual Raviart–Thomas mixed finite
elements are used.
We consider a domain Ω defined as the open bounded set delimited by two con-
centric circles in two-dimensional (2D) test cases or two concentric spheres in 3D test
cases. The inner boundary plays the role of Γi, where the trace and normal derivative
are missing, and the outer one plays the one of Γc where the latter information is over
specified.
We then consider explicit well-known analytical solutions, generically denoted by
u, which are harmonic inside the domain Ω, and set the trace and normal derivative
of u over Γc as being the measured data f = u|Γc and Φ = (k∇u.ν)|Γc . We sometimes
refer to these data as temperature and flux (with obvious interpretation).
In order to test the robustness of the proposed method we add white noise to the
temperature f and the heat flux Φ as follows:
(5.1) fσ = u+ σw1 and Φ
σ = k∇u.ν + σw2 on Γc,
where σ denotes the noise level relative to ‖.‖L2(Γc) of u and k∇u.ν, respectively,
whereas (w1, w2) are normelly distributed random functions.
Our algorithm performs a denoising task on the noisy prescribed Cauchy data
fσ and Φσ. For instance, let us denote by (τσN , η
σ
N ) the Nash equilibrium associ-
ated to the latter noisy over specified data. Then, the pair of optimal solutions
(u2(τN )|Γc , (k∇ũ1.ν)|Γc) may be viewed as regularized Cauchy data obtained from
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∇.k∇ũ1 = 0 in Ω,
ũ1 = u2(τN ) on Γc,
k∇ũ1.ν = ηN on Γi.
We present numerical results which illustrate the stability of our method with
respect to noisy data, as well as an example of the noise deblurring property outlined
above. The presented graphics are related to the profiles over Γi of the Dirichlet and
Neumann missing data and to the fields u1 and u2. We also provide convergence
relative errors history, related to the fields and to the missing profiles, as a function
of iterations and for different noise levels. We also present a stationarity history for
the Nash overall computation iterations.
The computation of the Nash equilibrium is performed as described in section
4, where the partial optimization tasks of Step 1 and Step 2 use a fixed line-search
gradient method. Here, during the early Nash steps, too accurate best response of
each player to the other’s strategy is not necessary; it is sufficient to carry out only a
few iterations in the optimization process. The number of iterations is then increased
as the process converges to the Nash equilibrium. A second formulation would be
obtained if we assume that the players compute not sequentially, but in parallel with
Step 1; in Step 2 we compute τ (k), which solves minτ J2(η
(k), τ).
An arbitrary initial guess such as S(0) = (η(0), τ (0)) = (0, 0) is chosen to start
the algorithm, the physical function k takes the constant value 1 in Ω, and the pa-
rameters α (weight of the coupling term in the costs), t (relaxation parameter in the
computation of Nash equilibrium), and ǫ (stopping criteria) are set to α = 1, t = 0.25
and ǫ = 0.002.
5.1. Two 2D test cases. Two test examples are selected from the literature,
particularly from [1] and references therein.
We consider an annular domain Ω with circular boundary components Γi and Γc,
both centered at (0, 0) and with radii Ri = 0.6 and Rc = 1, respectively.
Test case A. The first 2D experiment is related to a smooth case. The artificial
Cauchy data f and Φ are defined as respectively the trace and the normal derivative,
over the circle Γc, of the harmonic function:
u(x, y) = ex cos(y).
In this example, the finite element discretization of the domain boundary is made
of 180 outer vertices and 90 inner vertices.
In Figure 5.1, the missing data τN and ηN are presented at convergence of the
algorithm (4.1) dedicated to the computation of the Nash equilibrium for different
noise levels σ. The obtained Dirichlet as well as Neumann profiles show remarkable
stability with respect to noise.
The denoising effect, through computing the Nash equilibrium and solving (5.2),
is actually observed in Figure 5.2 for a noise level of 5%.
Test case B. The second 2D experiment is related to the singular function:





, where z = x+ iy.
In this case, the singularity source, located at a = (0.5, 0), is in the vicinity of the circle
Γi, and reconstruction of the solution over this boundary is a numerically challenging
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 1
 1.5



























Fig. 5.1. Test case A. Reconstructed smooth Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right) data
over Γi. The profiles are presented at convergence and for various noise levels σ ∈ {1%, 3%, 5%}.
The corresponding traces of the exact solution are also plotted. The finite element computations are































Fig. 5.2. Test case A. Regularization of noisy Cauchy data (noise level is σ = 5%). At
convergence: (left) the smoothed profile u2(τN )|Γc (− line) is compared to the random f
σ (+ dots);
(right) the smoothed flux profile k∇ũ1.ν|Γc (− line) is compared to Φ
σ (+ dots).
increasing the number of vertices on the boundary, we used 320 vertices on Γc and
180 vertices on Γi.
The results in Figure 5.3 show again the stability of our method. The profile shape
is well captured, including the localization of the singularity peak, whose magnitude,
however, is underestimated for the trace as well as for the normal derivative.
Finally, we led a comparison of our algorithm with the control-type method in-
troduced in [1]. This method was recently extended to the Stokes system in [2].
The proposed algorithm in [1] solves the classical minimization problem (2.3) with a
stopping criterion
(5.3) ‖u2 − f
σ‖L2(Γc) ≤ ε,
where ε is given tolerance error.
To compare the sensitivity to the noise level σ defined in (5.1), using the control-
type method [1] and our game method, numerical solutions were computed for test
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Fig. 5.3. Test case B. Reconstructed singular Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right) data
over Γi. The profiles are presented at convergence and for various noise levels σ ∈ {1%, 3%, 5%}.
The corresponding traces of the exact solution are also plotted. The finite element computations are
performed with 5405 nodes and 10,310 triangles.
Table 5.1
Test case A. Control type (classic) compared to Nash (game) algorithms. Relative L2-errors






for various noise levels.
Noise level σ = 2% σ = 5% σ = 8%
Reconstructed data Dirichlet–Neumann Dirichlet–Neumann Dirichlet–Neumann
Classic method 0.0222–0.1242 0.0387–0.2242 0.0573–0.3590
Nash game method 0.0196–0.1175 0.0253–0.1619 0.0338–0.2169
Table 5.1 represents the L2-errors on the reconstructed missing data for σ equal
to, respectively, 2%, 5%, and 8%. For σ = 8% a remarkable advantage is observed
for the game method in the reconstructed Neumann data. These differences are also
observed in Figure 5.4.
5.2. Two 3D test cases. As for the 2D case, we consider a thick spherical shell
domain Ω with boundary components Γi and Γc, which are two spheres both centered






























Fig. 5.4. Test case A. Control-type (classic) compared to Nash (game) algorithms for high
noise level σ = 8%. Reconstructed Dirichlet (left) and Neumann (right) data over Γi; the two are
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(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Fig. 5.5. Test case C. Top row: noise level is 0%. At convergence, we plot a plane slice of
the level sets of (a) u1 and (b) u2. Bottom row: noise level is 5%. At convergence, we plot the
level sets of (c) u1 and (d) u2. The finite element computations are performed with 4740 nodes and
22,795 tetrahedral elements.
Again two functions, denoted by u, are selected to play the role of exact solutions
to the Cauchy problem for the Laplace operator. To this end, the Cauchy data f
and Φ are defined as, respectively, the trace and normal derivative of the involved
functions over the sphere Γc.
Test case C. The first function is radial, so it is of constant trace over each of
the spherical components of the boundary:
(5.4) u(x, y, z) =
1
√
x2 + y2 + z2
.
The function u given by (5.4) is the solution of ∆u = δ0, where δ0 is the Dirac
distribution at the origin (0, 0, 0), a point source that is not in Ω, so u is harmonic
and smooth enough inside Ω.
In Figure 5.5, level set slices are shown for the fields u1 and u2 at convergence
for noise-free and 5% noisy data. The overall Nash algorithm (4.1) converged in 150
iterations. More detailed issues related to the convergence are presented in Figure 5.6.
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Fig. 5.6. Test case C. Top row: Relative L2-errors are presented as a function of overall Nash
iterations k for a noise level σ = 0%. (a) reconstructed fields: ‖u
(k)
i − u‖/‖u‖, i = 1, 2, and Nash





‖. Bottom row: the corresponding relative errors for a noise level σ = 5%
are plotted in (c)–(d).
reconstructed fields decrease, as do the ones relative to the missing data (converged
Nash strategies, which we recall are, respectively, the trace of u1 and the normal trace
of u2 over the sphere Γi).
The sensitivity of the reconstructed fields and missing data to the noise level σ
is shown in Figure 5.7. Interestingly, boundary missing data are much less sensitive
than the domain distributed fields. Both exhibit a satisfactory stable behavior w.r.t.
the noise magnitude.
Test case D. The second function is given by
(5.5) u(x, y, z) =
1
√
(x + 0.2)2 + y2 + z2
.
The function u given by (5.5) is the nonradial solution of ∆u = δX0 , where the
source term is now X0 = (−0.2, 0, 0).
In this experiment we put 5% of noise in (f,Φ) according to (5.1). The obtained
results are illustrated in Figure 5.8, where the reconstructed fields u1 and u2 are
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Fig. 5.7. Test case C. Sensitivity of the reconstructed fields to noisy Cauchy data (fσ ,Φσ).
L2-errors are presented as a function of the noise level σ: (a) reconstructed fields: ‖ui − u‖/‖u‖,







Fig. 5.8. Test case D. Nonradial case. Noise level is 5%. The level sets of the reconstructed
fields (a) u1 and (b) u2 are presented at convergence. The finite element computations are performed
with 4740 nodes and 22,795 tetrahedral elements.
and relative L2-errors on the reconstructed fields and boundary data are shown in
Figure 5.10.
Even though the error curves do monotonically decrease toward zero for the two
test cases C and D, the stagnation that appears quite early (around iterations 120–160
in the present case) suggests that multilevel or hierarchical optimization approaches
should be designed to speed up the convergence of the Nash algorithm.
In Figure 5.11, we compare for the 3D test case D the sensitivities of the control-
type method versus the Nash game algorithm with respect to the noise level σ. The
L2-error on Dirichlet and Neumann missing data are plotted, confirming the advantage
of the game algorithm already observed in the 2D comparison case. The difference
between the two reconstruction methods is much more striking as the noise level in-
creases. This advantage of the Nash game approach, however, should be moderated
by the observation that the overall Nash do loop needs to solve slightly more opti-
mization subtasks than the control-type methods. Parallel implementations should
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Fig. 5.9. Test case D. Reconstructed nonradial Dirichlet (τN , left) and Neumann (ηN , right)

























Fig. 5.10. Test case D. Relative L2-errors are presented for the nonradial case as a function
of the overall Nash iterations. Noise level is 5%. (a) reconstructed fields error: ‖u
(k)
i − u‖/‖u‖,
i = 1, 2 and Nash strategies ds = ‖S(k) −S(k−1)‖; (b) missing Dirichlet data: ‖τ (k) − u|Γi‖/‖u|Γi‖






















Fig. 5.11. Test case D. Robustness of the control-type (classic) method compared to the Nash
(game) method. Sensitivity of the corresponding reconstructed missing data to noisy Cauchy data
(fσ ,Φσ). L2-errors are presented as a function of the noise level σ: (left) Dirichlet ‖τN − u|Γi‖/
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6. Conclusion. Let us conclude the paper with some short remarks. First, we
have used the simplest class of games to model the completion problem, namely, the
class of static games with complete information. This simple game formulation yields
interesting results like the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, which is
exactly the missing data when the Cauchy problem has a solution. The decomposi-
tion not only of the control variable but also of the criteria allows for standard and
simple mathematical analysis to be used to prove stability results with respect to
perturbation of the Cauchy data. Investigation of more sophisticated classes of games
such as dynamical games with incomplete information may lead to new efficient data
completion algorithms.
Our method may be extended as it is to the linear elasticity and to the Stokes
systems; see [2] where a control-type setting for Stokes system has been studied.
Existence, uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, and stability properties should hold
with minimal adaption of the proofs. An application of the game algorithm to a
nonlinear elliptic case (Perona–Malik model for image inpainting) is ongoing.
It is also interesting to notice that solving the data completion problem with
our method makes use of the standard computational tools, be it finite element or
optimization codes. The numerical experiments presented for different 2D and 3D test
cases tend to prove that our method is efficient and exhibits better numerical stability
with respect to noisy Cauchy data than the classical control-type approaches.
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